Justice and Injustice
Justice and Injustice
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The nature of justice and injustice
Justice and injustice in Plato’s Republic are carefully debated in the course of cautious dialectic throughout the first few books. Unsatisfied with the defeat of Thrasymachus, Glaucon, and Adeimantus respectively and unwilling to surrender to the mainstream during our class dialectic, my purpose in the following essay is to defend the views of the above mentioned thinkers. I will attempt to distinguish which view is just and unjust, and I will also examine the essence of justice and injustice in terms of profitability and the truth I find in these two concepts. Following I will provide arguments in order to further support my thesis via the course of dialectic mentioned in the Republic, and by attempting to reinforce each scholar’s opinion with my own. By the truth, I do not refer to the truth of being outside the cave that Socrates claims as being the truth in his allegory of the cave. My truth for all matters of clarity is the truth related to anything that is susceptible to my senses; the truth I am referring to is my every day life, it is the shadows on the walls.
Individuals are just only out of necessity, and whenever it is safe for them to be unjust they will be unjust because injustice is more profitable (profitability will be defined in the latter part of the essay in a more relevant context). To prove this proposal, the most arduous task ahead of us and the first step necessary to stick with the proof is to provide for a clear interpretation of justice and injustice, and the allegory of the shepherd and the sheep may possibly be the best place to begin with because it will portray the perspective of both schools of thought. Thrasymachus argues with Socrates in the following manner:
You haven’t even been taught how to distinguish the shepherd from the sheep. [Socrates: What makes you say that?] Because you think that a shepherd fattens and tends sheep for the good of the animal rather than for the benefit of the shepherd or the owner. You don’t realize that the people who rule over states, if they are true rulers, think of their subjects as sheep to be fleeced, contemplating their own interest day and night. (Plato 25)
The Socratic view of justice tends to relate to the allegory that a shepherd depends to his sheep and hence will provide for them and nourish them, and slay them in the best possible manner. The best possible manner is defined in this situation as the choices the shepherd has to make in order to justify his needs in terms of survival. These needs principally come in the form of food and clothes; hence, by nourishing his flock and only consuming the sheep he needs for his survival the shepherd coincidentally finds that he is securing his lasting survival by retrospectively ensuring the reproduction of his flock. The Thrasymachean view of justice indicates that shepherds watch their flocks not in the sake of their sheep, but so the sheep can be fleeced and slaughtered for his profit. Although the allegory sheds light on the two schools of thought, the connection among justice and injustice and the story presented is still vague.
To further clarify what is just and unjust, both beliefs may relate the ruler and the citizen to the shepherd and the sheep respectively. The Thrasymachean belief asserts that the citizens are like sheep to be fleeced and slaughtered for the benefit of the ruler. The Socratic perspective on the other hand claims that the just ruler is to be rewarded a benefit only if none of the advantage of the rule goes to him and all of the ruling efforts are to the advantage of the people. Now in terms of profitability the Socratic view is a less profitable scenario for the shepherd because the benefits are dispersed, whereas the Thrasymachean view indicates that the benefits are more profitable for the shepherd since the shepherd is the only one receiving any benefits. Having clarified which scenario is more profitable, we must now recognize which situation portrays justice, and which depicts injustice.
Both Plato and Aristotle claimed that human beings are political and social beings. As political and social beings we have accredited the necessity of a republic, or a form of government. All forms of rule, whether tyrannical, democratic or aristocratic, inherently set apart and segregate their citizens from a former equal state to a subordinate state (a state in which just a few exercise their ordained authority over the masses). Now, the analysis of whether this is right or wrong, is not our main concern. The fact of the matter is that this is how it is. Our authorities (in whatever form of government they represent themselves) are the ones implementing the rules, and in distinguishing amid what is just, and what is unjust; subsidiary citizens have no influence over such matters. Furthermore, since justice is implemented through power and authorities are the power between the citizen-authoritarian relationship, we may safely result to the fact that authority has all the control amid and option of being just, or being unjust. Hence, as Thrasymachus very clearly stated, “In all cases the government has the power, so the only reasonable conclusion is that everywhere there is but one principle of justice: the interest of the stronger.” (Plato 19) The Thrasymachean position is justified since the interest of the weaker has no effect on justice whatsoever. In response to a position that argues that democracy allows for the input of the people in identifying justice and not justice, while this may be true to an extent in relation to other forms of government, pragmatically the authorities have the upper-hand in their decision making. Democracy and the power of giving justice and not justice has never been utilized through the extent that the people may have a lasting impact on a decision and if it has, then only rarely. To continue, given that we earlier examined the profitability scenarios of both the Socratic and Thrasymachean positions, it is now relatively easier for us to indicate which view is just and which is unjust, hence identifying which is more profitable than the other. But, before we do that we must define our interests and identify why profitability is important to us as social beings.
Profitability, monetary value and currency have become the method of survival for thousands of years now; as social beings we have discovered the science of trade and we have realized that our purpose in life need not only be to ensure our survival. Through the accumulation of currency, and via maintaining a steady trade of services and products we have found that we can devote our lives to things other than just our survival. This in fact also implies that as long as we have these currencies (in whatever shape or form they present themselves as) we have to accept our interdependence to others (this presents us with a paradoxical argument that will be discussed at a latter point). Naturally, the more currency we have to trade, the more we can attain in the monetary aspect of our lives. Hence, we all strive to become as profitable as possible in order to satisfy our desires and appetites in the world we live in.
Since the Thrasymachean view is the most profitable, and since it also distinguishes amid the weak and the strong, we may now say that this view may portray both justice and injustice. But, since we are dealing with two possible scenarios instead of one, we must rule out either justice or injustice. In order to do this we must use some mathematical and logical reasoning. The Socratic view exemplifies a mutual state amid citizen and ruler; no one entity is more powerful than the other and both entities technically have an equally distributed amount of the benefits, and therefore there is no weaker or stronger entity. Thus the influence over electing what is just and unjust is equally distributed and we may safely conclude that the Socratic scenario is the more just scenario and the less profitable one. Consequently, the Thrasymachean position is the unjust position because the element of power exists that is not inherent in the Socratic view; thus the Thrasymachean position is more profitable.
Now that we have agreed that injustice is more profitable, we must now elaborate on whether or not individuals are indeed just only out of necessity. In book two of the Republic, Glaucon “vigorously [polishes justice and injustice], as if they were statues to be put on exhibit.” (Plato 49). Glaucon argues that justice is merely the inability to do justice, and presents the story of Gyges, the ancestor of Croesus the Lydian. Gyges after having attained the golden ring (a ring that gave him the power to become invisible) and realizing its powers uses it to seduce the queen and in turn murder the king and take over the kingdom.
Let’s suppose there were two such magic rings, one worn by a just person and the other by an unjust person. Nobody is strong enough to remain just in such a situation. No one would remain honest who could safely take anything from the marketplace, or go into any house and copulate with anyone, or kill or release from prison anyone they choose, generally acting with godlike power among human beings. Then the actions of the just would be no different from the actions of the unjust; they would seek the same goal. This clearly proves that people are just not freely or because they think that justice is in their interest-they are just out of necessity. Whenever people can be safely unjust, they will be unjust. In their hearts, they believe that injustice is far more profitable to the individual than justice, and those who follow this line of thought would say that they are right (Plato 48).
I feel that Glaucon has presented us with the pinnacle and the ultimate distinction amid justice and injustice. Keenly supporting his view and his ultimatum against justice I would have to agree as he later states in his argument that the “high point of injustice is to be considered just when you are not” (Plato 48). The definitive understanding of whether or not justice is better than injustice or visa a versa is by providing an example that tactfully explains the cost and penalties of both standings. Let us assume that there are two individuals; one who is wholeheartedly just and one who isn’t. If we presume that the unconditionally just person and thus the best possible being is considered to be the worst in the eyes of the public (and vice a versa for the unjust individual) then in due course high merit should defend against ill repute and its consequences. Pragmatically it is far from being so; in the end the unjust person will reign and honor in the eyes of a republic whereas the just person will be crucified. Undisputedly the most powerful testimonial to this assertion and in its most extreme form is in the life of the Son of God; Jesus of Nazareth, the supreme being, is sentenced to death while Barabas the entirely unjust individual, and a murderer of his time was given freedom.
Although I have concluded my original assertions that individuals are just out of necessity and that injustice is more profitable, Socrates presents to us several very solid arguments that are in dire need to be discussed, but before we do so throughout my proof I realized that I formed a paradoxical argument. Although injustice may indeed be more profitable for an individual, it certainly limits profitability because of the lack of interdependence. Via a macro economical perspective, interdependence is what may make justice a lot more profitable for a number of individuals; not just one. Hence the argument presented before is only limited to the scope of the individual in which it is valid.
Socrates presents us with a very convincing argument, claiming that interests differ from individual to individual. Not all individuals’ value monetary value and not all individuals or entities serve their own interests. Bountiful examples are presented to us, such as the science of medicine and the fact that “medicine does not consider the interest of medicine, but the interest of the body.” (Plato 23) Socrates also righteously claims that each “craft serves [an] interest; that is its origin and purpose.” (Plato 22) But what is overlooked in the argument (probably intentionally) is that each craft has been developed and is constantly perfected due to an interest, and that interest stems to just were we started from, the individual. As medicine considers the interest of the body, the individual considers medicine as his or her own interest as well. The primary source of interest attains more of a profit as long as a craft further develops and may better serve its interest. The motive of a profit is what has guided the entrepreneurial spirit of man to develop crafts throughout the ages. I also feel that Socrates’ argument is erroneous in the effect that the interests of an individual cannot be compared to the interests of an intangible entity, such as medicine or art. In a latter time during the argument, Socrates accepts that all interests have something in common, and that is the ability of money-making; but to further argue the Thrasymachaen view he provides the example of the practitioner, claiming that practitioners or others skilled in a craft provide benefits when working for free (hence removing the ability to receive pay from the equation). Well, my response to this is that yes, if any formed of skilled individuals worked for free, they would sincerely provide for the interest of their craft, and not of their own and their would still be a benefit to their clients. But the fact of the matter is that skilled individuals that are able to provide services and products do not work for free (they are always in search of some form of payment); and we shouldn’t take into consideration something that does not touch upon the truth.
The Socratic argument defending justice further elaborates in an embellishment of reality, where Socrates defines the three aspects of the soul: reason, spirit and appetite. He reasons that “injustice is clearly a kind of rebellion in which one aspect attacks the soul itself by meddling and interfering with the proper function or the other aspects. It is a kind of insurrection, like that of a rebellious subject against a true and natural ruler. The confusion and error caused by this disorder is injustice, excess, cowardice, and ignorance-every conceivable evil.” (Plato 165) This undeniably must be Socrates’ truth about the matter. My truth finds hard to accept this illustration of the soul because it is not clear to me at all. Although his argument seems flawless and solid in its foundation, his oratory ability makes it even more so. If we do assume for the moment that there are three parts to the soul at minimum, who is to say that there inherently exists a balance, if at all. I protest the inclination to compare the soul to a subject-ruler relationship as Socrates does because the soul is undeniably a lot more complex than such simplistic associations. I object to argue at such an intangible level because although I may make a valid argument, what good is it if it is not verified. Or better yet, why make an argument that not only cannot be verified, but inherently is not meant to be understood due to its nature?
Socrates also claims that in the long-term, his justice may in fact be more profitable. This may perhaps be so, because with increased interdependence and trade, there may indeed be a way for an individual to become more profitable through the association with other people. This argument had the potential to become the strongest argument Socrates made against the Thrasymachean view, but in fact turned out to be the weakest. The long-term is not clearly defined in his assertion, and there are too many variable elements that affect the long-term. In fact, the long-term has the potential to be more profitable and less profitable at the same time in contrast to Thrasymachean view. There is too much uncertainty concerning the long-term, especially if we were to assume that individual behaviors and actions result from the tri-parti soul. Socrates’ three aspects of the soul are the strongest proofs of uncertainty that arise in the long-term; his allegory is also that which allows us to overcome his argument of justice being more profitable. If we were to assume that the tri-parti theory is pragmatic, it would be reasonable to suggest that individuals could only wrestle their appetite for monetary value for only so long. The ambiguousness of the long-term would definitely imply that other elements of the soul would overcome reason in pursuing injustice, which would be more profitable for the short-term.
Socrates’ allegory of the cave seems to be relevant in our context because we obviously have a circumstance of colliding truths. Socrates is positioned outside the cave and speaks from another truth; a truth that may be more innocent in form from my truth. I say ‘may be’, because although I am convinced of the allegory, I don’t understand to what extent Socrates has reached the outside of the cave; perhaps Socrates is innately biased in his opinions and has the views he has because of the life he led (all while being inside the cave throughout), or perhaps so am I. It is evident now that the Thrasymachean view (my view being a part of it) collides with the Socratic view at so many levels because the truth that each party possesses is intrinsically different. So perhaps, next time Socrates wants to have dialectic he should be careful about his subjects and understand their truths and try to adapt to them; that would be wiser. Trying to convince someone that their truth is skewed while all throughout knowing that they cannot possibly understand the truth you know is in practice negligent. A proper dialectic should inherit parties of equal truths, parties that are all at the same level and can see eye to eye. Conclusively, in all matters presented by Socrates I would have to disagree and still stay true to the Thrasymachean view, because my truth only accepts for me to do so. So for now, dear Socrates, let us agree to disagree because the light is hurting my eyes and I would like to turn my head towards the shadows.
Works Cited
Plato. Plato’s Republic. Trans. Benjamin Jowett. Rev. Albert A. Anderson. Boston, Massachusetts: Agora Publications, 2001.
Disclaimer
The above essay was written by a college student and merely states opinions of a college student. However, if you feel strong about responding to the opinions stated, please write to articles@directorym.com and express your concerns.
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